Abstract-We estimate the impact of employer-provided retiree health insurance (EPRHI) on the labor force transitions of men aged 51 to 62. Data from the Health and Retirement Survey provide detailed and accurate measures of retiree health insurance. Availability of EPRHI increases the rate of exit from employment by two percentage points per year if the individual shares the cost of the insurance with the firm, and by six percentage points if the firm pays the entire cost. The impact of costshared EPRHI on the annual rate of labor force exit increases with age, reaching 7.5 percentage points by age 61.
I. Introduction
T HE effect of health insurance reform on the employment behavior of older workers is of considerable interest. A reform that breaks the close link between employment and health insurance coverage could lead to a substantial increase in the already high rate of labor force exit before age 65. Two observations suggest that retiree health insurance may play an important role in the retirement decisions of older workers. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) of men aged 55-64 declined sharply in the 1970s but much more slowly in the 1980s. Social Security retirement benefits have been suggested as an explanation, because benefits became considerably more generous during the 1970s but did not increase by much in real terms in the 1980s. However, eligibility for Social Security benefits does not begin until age 62, and the decline in the male LFPR was quite large at ages 59-61 as well as at 62-64 (Burkhauser & Quinn, 1994; Peracchi & Welch, 1994) . Furthermore, studies based on time-series data find that increased generosity and coverage of Social Security can account for only a small part of the decline in the male LFPR. 1 Time-series data on retiree health insurance are not available, but cross-sectional data from a variety of sources suggest that such coverage became increasingly common in the 1970s and then declined from the mid-1980s through the 1990s. 2 This suggests the possibility that changes in the prevalence of retiree health insurance may have contributed to changing patterns of retirement.
A second observation that suggests the potential importance of retiree health insurance in retirement decisions is the sharp spike in the labor force exit rate at age 65. Workers who place a high value on health insurance and whose employers do not provide retiree health insurance may choose to delay retirement until they become eligible for Medicare benefits at age 65, particularly in view of the high cost of privately purchased health insurance. Many other explanations for the age-65 spike in the labor force exit rate have been proposed, but most have received little empirical support. The absence of employer-provided retiree health insurance coverage for many workers and the availability of Medicare coverage at age 65 is one plausible explanation for the spike that has received some support. 3 Reduced-form evidence from previous studies suggests that workers with employer-provided retiree health insurance (EPRHI) tend to leave the labor force at younger ages than otherwise similar workers without such coverage. Gruber and Madrian (1995 Madrian ( , 1996 exploit the "natural experiment" generated by passage of Continuation Coverage mandates by a number of states, followed by Federal passage as part of the 1985 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). These mandates require firms with employment above some minimum level to provide continuation of health care benefits for up to 18 months to workers who leave the firm. Gruber and Madrian show that men aged 62-64 were three to five percent more likely to be out of the labor force in those years and states in which a mandate was in effect. Madrian's (1994) estimates based on cross-section samples of individuals already retired at the survey date suggest that those with EPRHI coverage retired up to 1.5 years earlier than otherwise similar individuals without such coverage. 4 Three recent studies have estimated structural models of labor force exit decisions that incorporate health insurance. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994) use models which they had previously developed for the purpose of estimating the impact of Social Security and pensions on labor force exit behavior. They add to the budget constraint measures of the average cost of health insurance, reestimate their models, and find that the parameter estimates and implied retirement behavior are virtually identical with or without health insurance included. Rust and Phelan (1997) argue that this approach is likely to be a serious misspecification. The expected value of medical expenses is relatively low at ages 55-64, so valuing health insurance coverage at its average cost changes the budget constraint by only a small amount. But a major component of the value of health insurance to risk-averse individuals is the coverage that it provides against low-probability, high-cost health events. The estimates of these two studies cannot account for this source of demand for insurance. Rust and Phelan allow for risk aversion and model the entire distribution of medical expenditures rather than the mean only. Their estimates indicate that individuals in their Retirement History Survey (RHS) sample are quite risk averse and that the availability of EPRHI has a substantial impact on the timing of labor force exit. Their data show that men aged 60-61 with EPRHI coverage are up to ten percentage points more likely to exit the labor force during a two-year period than are men without EPRHI, and their model reproduces this feature of the data quite closely.
Several problems with previous studies make a new analysis worthwhile. First, most studies have not had access to accurate information about the retiree provisions of health insurance plans. For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Karoly and Rogowski (1994) had to impute EPRHI coverage from other data sources based on industry, firm size, and region. Rust and Phelan had to impute EPRHI coverage by observing how health insurance coverage of the men in their sample changed over time as their employment status changed. Madrian (1994) used three data sets, only one of which contains specific information on EPRHI; EPRHI coverage is only inferred from other questions about health insurance in the other data sources. In each of these studies, EPRHI coverage was likely measured with error, introducing biases into the estimates of the effects of EPRHI coverage. Second, much of the data used in previous studies is either cross-sectional, longitudinal but old, or derived from a single firm. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994) use longitudinal data from a single firm. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) and Rust and Phelan use longitudinal data from the RHS, which ended in 1979 and may be quite dated for purposes of analyzing current trends and policies. Madrian (1994) and Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) use both cross-sectional data and short panels from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 5 Karoly and Rogowski (1994) also use short panels from the SIPP. We show below that crosssectional data are likely to be of limited use in analyzing the effect of EPRHI on labor force behavior because of unobserved heterogeneity that induces spurious correlation between EPRHI and labor force status. This problem can be overcome by using longitudinal data and an estimation method that allows for such a correlation. The SIPP data are useful and relatively recent, but all of the studies that use these data treat initial employment status as given. These studies are thus potentially subject to the same unobserved heterogeneity problem as studies that use cross-sectional data. Finally, all of these studies treat health insurance and EPRHI coverage as exogenous. Health insurance and EPRHI could be endogenous for a number of reasons: both are job characteristics, and individuals choose a job; some employers offer multiple health insurance plans, and workers choose a plan; and some workers have access to a health insurance plan from the spouse's employer, and choose whether to be covered by their own employer's plan, the spouse's employer's plan, both, or neither. Cameron et al. (1988) test and reject the hypothesis that health insurance coverage is exogenous in a model of medical care demand.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of retiree health insurance on the rate of labor force entry and exit and job switching of older men using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The equations that we estimate represent an approximation of the employment decision rules that are implied by a dynamic stochastic model of employment decisions. These equations include measures of retiree health insurance coverage that are similar to those used in previous studies, but that are more accurately measured and have greater detail on the provisions of coverage. For example, the HRS provides information on whether the respondent pays the entire cost of EPRHI coverage, which is a potentially important determinant of the effect of EPRHI. Our specification also includes measures of several other important job characteristics that may influence employment behavior and are likely to be correlated with the availability of EPRHI, including detailed measures of pension characteristics. We use a flexible, semiparametric, random-effects specification to account for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity. As part of this specification, models for initial employment status, health status, health insurance coverage, and EPRHI coverage are estimated jointly with the employment-transition models. Our results provide clear evidence that these variables are endogenous. The empirical results indicate that EPRHI coverage has a strong positive effect on exit from employment, especially if the firm pays the entire cost of the EPRHI coverage. These effects are especially large for men aged 59-61. The estimated effects of EPRHI coverage in our results are larger than those found in previous studies. We demonstrate that this is due in part to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, and also to the availability of more-accurate measures of health insurance in the HRS than those used in most previous studies. Section II describes the behavioral model and the employment equations derived from the model. Section III discusses the HRS data, section IV presents and discusses the estimates, and section V concludes.
II. The Model
We expect that older men with employer-provided health insurance that also provides EPRHI coverage are more likely to exit the labor force and are less likely to change jobs or reenter the labor force than are otherwise similar men without EPRHI coverage. EPRHI provides insurance against unforeseen medical expenses while not employed. A risk-averse man who is subject to a non-negligible risk of an adverse health outcome that would require large medical expenditures is less likely to leave his job until becoming eligible for Medicare, if leaving his job means giving up his health insurance. Furthermore, a man's current health status provides information about the distribution of future health outcomes, so we expect that EPRHI coverage will have a stronger effect on behavior for men in worse health. That is, the perceived probability of an adverse health outcome will influence the strength of the EPRHI effect on employment transitions. The effect of EPRHI on employment transitions might also depend on age, but the direction of the age effect is not obvious a priori. An older man without EPRHI who leaves his job faces a shorter period with no health insurance than does a younger man, because Medicare eligibility begins at 65. This suggests that the effect of EPRHI would diminish with age. But, for a given current health status, the perceived risk of a poor health outcome in the future is likely to increase with age, causing the effect of EPRHI on employment transitions to become stronger with age.
We develop a model that incorporates these ideas and use it to demonstrate the conditions under which these propositions hold. We then develop an econometric model that represents an approximation to the decision rules implied by the theory.
A. The Behavioral Model 6
Time is discrete, and there is a finite horizon, T. An individual chooses his employment status at the beginning of each period, and it remains fixed for the duration of the period. The individual's health status for the period becomes known to him after he has chosen his employment status for the period. The two employment states are employed and not employed. Hours worked are fixed when employed. If an individual was employed in period t Ϫ 1, his alternatives in period t are to 1 become non-employed, 2 take a new job, or 3 remain in the current job. If he was not employed, his alternatives are to remain non-employed or accept a new job. One new job offer is received at the beginning of each period with characteristics-including the wage rate and provisions for health insurance coverage-denoted by the vector N t . The state variables determined by choices made in previous periods are denoted by the vector s t and include the employment state at the end of the previous period, job tenure, and characteristics of the most recently held job. The current employment decision has future consequences, because earnings and nonwage income may depend on job tenure and because employee and retiree health insurance are job characteristics. We assume that there is no capital market.
The two health states are good (h t ϭ 0) and bad (h t ϭ 1), and transitions among health states are determined by a Markov process. The probability of moving from health state i in period t Ϫ 1 to health state a in period t is given by
where t i0 ϩ t i1 ϭ 1 @i, @t, Z t is a vector of observed exogenous characteristics, and is an unobserved permanent error component.
The utility associated with health state i and employment choice j during period t is given by
where C t is consumption of a composite commodity,
, @j) is a vector indicating which employment alternative is chosen,
is a vector of period t state-and-choicespecific utility shocks known to the individual at the beginning of period t, U ij (⅐) is the utility of consumption, and ij is a parameter. The utility derived from consumption is allowed to depend on health and employment status. If U ij (⅐) is concave, then individuals are risk averse and willing to purchase actuarially fair health insurance.
The budget constraint is given by 
where ␤ is the discount factor, and V i (s t ) is the maximal expected value of lifetime utility at period t given a particular health state i in the previous period:
To illustrate the implications of the model, consider the following very simple special case. Suppose that the only state variable is EPRHI status: the state vector s t consists of the single variable s t ϭ 1 if the individual has EPRHI coverage, and s t ϭ 0 otherwise. Assume that all jobs provide health insurance and the same fixed level of earnings to active employees, so that jobs differ only in whether they offer EPRHI. Health insurance carries a constant premium p regardless of whether it offers EPRHI; if the job offers EPRHI, the premium p is also paid when not employed. If health is good, then medical expenses are zero. If health is bad, then medical expenses of m are incurred. These expenses are fully covered by health insurance or EPRHI but are paid by the individual if he is not employed and not covered by EPRHI. Benefits (b) are zero if employed, and are constant and independent of the date of labor force exit if not employed. Finally, let the utility of consumption be C ␣ j , where 0 Ͻ ␣ j Ͻ 1.
Consider a man who was employed in period T Ϫ 1, enters period T in health state i, and is deciding whether to exit the labor force (alternative 1), take a new job (alternative 2), or remain at the current job (alternative 3) during period T. Because decisions made in period T have no future effects, because jobs differ by EPRHI availability only, and because all jobs are assumed to provide health insurance to active workers, characteristics of the new job offer are irrelevant to the period T decision. We ignore and ⑀ because they have no bearing on the predictions and consider only the deterministic part of the value function
. If the current job has EPRHI coverage (s T ϭ 1), then the value associated with each alternative is
The value of each alternative if the current job does not provide
The optimal choice will be to exit the labor force if
EPRHI does not affect the value of employment, as the above expressions show, because all jobs are assumed to provide health insurance to active employees. Therefore, EPRHI unambiguously increases the likelihood of exiting the labor force in period
A sufficient condition for the expression in equation four to be positive is that the premium is less than or equal to the actuarially fair price (p ϭ (1 Ϫ i0 )m). Therefore, in this simple example, EPRHI increases the likelihood of exit from the labor force in period T. Furthermore, the expression is decreasing in i0 , so the higher the chance of experiencing bad health (that is, the smaller the value of i0 ), the larger is the effect of EPRHI on labor force exit. It is straightforward to show that the likelihood of changing jobs and the likelihood of entering employment conditional on being out of the labor force are both determined by the same expression with the sign reversed. So EPRHI decreases labor force entry and job switching. The intuition for these results is clear: EPRHI raises current utility when not employed, but does not affect current utility when employed. It is easily shown that EPRHI increases the value of future utility unconditional on the employment state or the job-offer characteristics, so the sign of equation (4) also determines the effect of EPRHI in all periods. Extending the model to allow individuals to purchase a private health insurance policy to provide coverage when not employed does not change these results if it is assumed that privately purchased health insurance carries a higher premium than does employer-provided insurance.
Two important factors omitted from the model are family considerations and savings. Married men are sometimes covered by their wives' employer-provided health insurance plan (and vice versa), and many health insurance plans that decision variable and affects health and utility directly (Blau & Gilleskie, 2000) . See also Gilleskie (1998) . 8 As indicated, we assume that an individual receives one new job offer per period, but we do not observe the characteristics N t of the job offer unless the individual accepts the new job. The probability that the offer received is of type f is f , f ϭ 1, . . . , F. Thus, unconditional on the characteristics of the new job, the EPDV of lifetime utility is
provide spouse coverage allow spouses of retired workers to be covered as well. There can be strong incentives for married couples to coordinate their employment decisions so that health insurance coverage is available for both members of the couple. Individuals who lack EPRHI coverage could "self-insure" by saving while working, in anticipation of being uninsured while retired. Both of these considerations could weaken or eliminate the positive effect of EPRHI on labor force exit predicted by our theoretical model. These are important areas for future research.
B. The Empirical Model
We specify a linear approximation to the value of occupying employment state j in period t, conditional on having been in employment state k in period t Ϫ 1:
where X is a vector of state variables, including job tenure, the wage rate, and characteristics of the individual's health insurance and pension coverage. These variables have direct effects on the current period decision but also may affect current behavior because they determine expectations of the future values of random variables. The approximation approach does not attempt to disentangle the effects of variables in X tϪ1 on current and future decisions, in contrast to estimation of the structural parameters. The probability of making a transition from employment state k to j is given by
where J k is the number of employment alternatives available to an individual in state k, and the ⑀'s are assumed to be independently extreme-value distributed. These assumptions yield a pair of dynamic multinomial logit models of transitions from employment and from non-employment. The models are dynamic because of the (testable) assumption that the probability of occupying state j today depends on the state occupied in the previous period, and because X contains lagged choice variables. The models are linked by dependence on the common unobserved factor , which is treated as a random effect and is integrated out of the model. We follow Mroz (1999) and Heckman and Singer (1984) in approximating the distribution of by a step function. The points of support of the distribution, the factor loadings (), and the probabilities associated with each point of support are estimated jointly with the other parameters. An important consideration in obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters of this model is the fact that health status, health insurance coverage, tenure, the wage rate, and other state variables observed at the initial survey are likely to be correlated with the permanent error component () if previous employment decisions were determined by the same model as the employment decisions beginning at the initial survey. Failure to account for the initial-conditions problem would lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. We deal with this by specifying models for the initial conditions as of the first survey, allowing them to be functions of , and estimating the parameters of the initial-conditions models jointly with the other parameters. This approach was followed by Blau (1994) and is consistent with the approaches suggested by Heckman (1981) . In addition to the endogenous initial conditions previously described, we also allow health insurance and health in periods after the first survey to be endogenous. This accounts for the possibility that the unobserved determinants of health insurance decisions and health outcomes are correlated with the unobserved determinants of employment behavior. Finally, we model attrition from the survey between the first two waves. The likelihood function is given in appendix A.
III. The Health and Retirement Survey Data
The empirical analysis uses the public-release data files from the first two waves of the HRS, which were fielded in 1992 and 1994. The population sampled in the HRS consists of men and women aged 51-61 in 1992 and, if married, their spouses. 9 The sample contains 4,552 male respondents aged 51-61; we use 4,080 age-eligible men with complete data on key variables. 10 Approximately 9% of these men were not interviewed in the second wave, and another 2% failed to provide the information needed to compute employment status in the second wave.
A. Employment Status
Employment status can be measured in the HRS at monthly intervals between surveys. However, other key variables such as health and health insurance are measured only as of the survey dates. We analyze employment transitions between the wave 1 survey date (denoted W1) and a date one year after the wave 1 survey (denoted W1ϩ1), and between W1ϩ1 and the wave 2 survey date (W2), which is two years after the wave 1 survey, on average. This provides two annual employment transitions to explain. 11 However, most of the variables used to explain the transitions are available only at W1 and W2: if the value of an explanatory variable changed between waves, we do not know whether it changed before or after W1ϩ1. For example, if an individual indicated that the characteristics of his health insurance or pension coverage changed between W1 and W2 and the individual was employed at the same firm at both dates, then we do not know when the change occurred. We estimate two alternative specifications to deal with this problem. The first specification uses variables from W1 to explain transitions between W1 and W1ϩ1, and variables from W2 to explain transitions between W1ϩ1 and W2. This specification would be correct if changes in the values of explanatory variables between W1 and W2 always occured by W1ϩ1. The second specification uses W1 values of the explanatory variables to explain both transitions. This specification would be correct if changes in the values of the explanatory variables always occurred after W1ϩ1. 12 Both specifications are potentially subject to specification error, but, if they yield similar results, then we will have more confidence in our findings. Table 1 describes the distribution of the sample by employment status at the three dates. 13 The employment rate falls from 78.5% at W1 to 76.3% at W1ϩ1, and to 71.9% at W2. Table 1 also shows that the proportion of men who are employed in long-tenure jobs (at least five years) declines from 58.9% at W1 to 48.8% at W2, while the proportion employed in short-tenure jobs rises by 3.5 percentage points. The proportion employed full time (over thirty hours per week) falls by 7.5 percentage points between W1 and W2, while the proportion employed part time rises by almost one point. Table 2 presents employment-transition matrices for W1 to W1ϩ1 and W1ϩ1 to W2. Of the non-censored cases, 87% of those employed remain on the same job between adjacent periods, 5% take a new job, and 8% leave employment. Of those not employed at W1, 14% of the noncensored cases are employed at W1ϩ1, while only 7% of those not employed at W1ϩ1 have taken a job by W2. The rate of exit from employment to non-employment between W1ϩ1 and W2 is more than twice as large for those who changed jobs between W1 and W1ϩ1, compared to those on the same job at W1ϩ1 and W1. This suggests that "bridge jobs" are still an important labor market phenomenon for older men (Ruhm, 1990) .
B. Health Insurance
The HRS collected information on health insurance coverage directly from respondents and by telephone interview with the employer or former employer. Health insurance data from the employer interviews were not available when this study began. These data recently became available but contain so much missing information that the sample available for estimation would be drastically reduced if they were used. Therefore, we do not incorporate them here. Without these data, it is not possible to measure the complete set of relevant health insurance characteristics such as the premium, deductible, and copayment that enter the medical expenditure function m t ϭ m(t, h t , d t , s t ). Instead, we specify dichotomous indicators of health insurance coverage from each of the following sources: a group plan provided by a current or former employer, a group plan provided by the spouse's current or former employer, Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration or coverage provided to civilian employees of the military (VA/ CHAMPUS), and a privately purchased plan. Many individuals have coverage from more than one source. Individuals with no health insurance represent the omitted category in the empirical analysis. We also include indicators for whether the individual or the firm pays the entire health insurance premium, with cost sharing as the omitted category. Individuals with coverage from an employer plan (own or spouse) were assigned to the following categories of employer-provided retiree health insurance (EPRHI) coverage based on their responses to the surveys: covered, not covered, and unknown. Descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables as of wave 1 are shown in table 3. Three-quarters of the men in the sample have health insurance coverage from their own or their spouse's current or former employer, and 69.7% of these cases (81% of the non-missing cases) have EPRHI coverage. This figure is very similar to coverage reported in other data sources (Fronstin et al., 1994) . We also define dichotomous indicators for whether the individual or the employer paid the entire cost of EPRHI coverage; the omitted category is cost sharing. This is important because continuation coverage mandated by COBRA requires many firms to provide continued health insurance coverage to workers who leave employment, for up to eighteen months after departure. However, the individuals can be charged the full cost of the health insurance. Some individuals in the HRS who indicated that they have EPRHI coverage may in fact not have such coverage but could be instead reporting the fact that they are employed in firms that are required to provide continuation of coverage. Continuation coverage mandated by COBRA is likely to have quite different effects than EPRHI on employment decisions because it lasts for only eighteen months. Thus, it is important to attempt to distinguish cases with EPRHI from cases with COBRA coverage. The dichotomous indicator for whether the individual pays the entire cost of EPRHI coverage is likely to accurately distinguish COBRA cases from true EPRHI cases, because most EPRHI plans involve cost sharing or full payment by the firm (Morrisey, Jensen, & Henderlite, 1990) . 14 The cost of privately purchased health insurance should be included in the model, because such insurance is available to anyone who is willing to pay the cost and to accept the terms of the coverage, such as the exclusion of preexisting conditions. The HRS asked whether respondents had ever applied and been turned down for private health insurance, and only 5% of men reported being turned down. However, the cost of such insurance typically varies substantially with health status and other characteristics of individuals, and the HRS provides information on the cost of privately purchased health insurance only for the 16% of men who actually purchased such a policy. Therefore, we are not able to include this variable. If the price facing an individual for privately purchased health insurance is uncorrelated with the availability of EPRHI, then omitting this price will not bias our estimates of the effect of EPRHI.
C. Health Status
The HRS contains numerous detailed measures of health status. We use a dichotomous indicator of self-assessed health status derived by classifying responses of excellent, very good, and good together (denoted "good"), and responses of fair and poor together (denoted "bad"). We also examine how the results are affected when other health measures are used. These other measures are listed in Table 3 .
D. Income
The behavioral model contains an earnings function e(t, d t , s t ) and a nonwage income (benefit) function b(t, d t , s t ). In the empirical model, we include as regressors the following elements of s t :
Ⅲ the individual's hourly wage rate if employed Ⅲ monthly pension and/or Social Security benefits if the individual is currently receiving benefits Ⅲ an indicator for whether the Social Security benefits, if any, are from the Social Security Disability (SSDI) program 15 Ⅲ a variety of characteristics of the individual's pension plan that affect the future pension benefit if he is not currently receiving benefits Ⅲ total nonwage, nonasset income (including the wife's earnings) Ⅲ the total net worth of the household.
The pension plan characteristics include the type of plan (defined benefit or defined contribution; some individuals have both), the number of years until the individual is eligible for benefits, the accumulated amount in the pension account for defined contribution plans, and the percentage reduction in benefits for early retirement. 16 14 Changes in EPRHI coverage between waves are relatively rare. Thirty men reported gaining EPRHI coverage and 22 reported losing it. The majority of the gainers (eighteen) were employed on the same job in both waves, suggesting that the firm added EPRHI coverage as a benefit, or that the respondent misreported EPRHI coverage in one of the waves. Six of the gainers changed jobs between waves. Eight of the losers remained on the same job, while nine changed jobs between waves. The HRS does not report whether there are any age, tenure, or other requirements for EPRHI eligibility. 15 Variables related to SSDI benefit receipt are included only in the non-employment to employment transitions because very few employed workers receive such benefits. 16 Other pension characteristics that were included in some versions of the model but eventually dropped were the employer and employee contribution rates, whether benefits can be taken as a lump sum, and whether benefits are adjusted for Social Security, all for defined-benefit plans. A considerable amount of additional information about pensions was collected directly from the employers but was not available when we began this study. Social Security earnings records were also unavailable when this study began.
E. Other Variables
The other variables included in the employment transition model are age, job tenure, duration of the current spell of nonemployment, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, an indicator for past military service, marital status, whether the respondent was born in the United States, self-employment status, and union status. We do not include spouse characteristics such as employment status and health because, as previously argued, we believe that such variables should be treated as jointly determined with the husband's decisions. 17 A number of other variables are excluded from the employment-transition models but are included as identifying instruments in the initial-conditions and attrition models. These include the education of the respondent's mother and father; whether the mother and father are alive and their ages, if alive, or age at death and years since death, if not; and the number of siblings. We treat these family background variables not as elements of the vector X of determinants of preferences and health transitions, but rather as determinants of the initial conditions. We argue that these family background variables influence the initial employment status of the respondent at W1, but conditional on this initial status have no effect on employment transitions. Similarly, family background could affect initial health and health insurance status. These variables are therefore included in the initial employment status equation and the health, health insurance, and EPRHI equations, but are 17 Blacks were oversampled by design. The high rate of past military activity likely is due to the fact that the older men in the sample were of prime age for military service during the Korean War, and the younger men during the Vietnam War. omitted from the employment-transition models. Below, we report the results of tests of this identification strategy. Note that the nonlinear nature of the discrete-factor, randomeffects model allows the model to be identified without any exclusion restrictions. 18 Attrition is an event that occurs after W1 and could be modeled with a specification similar to the employment-transition equations. For example, a "structural" model of attrition could be derived from our theory by allowing attrition to be a choice or as resulting from death. We chose instead to specify the attrition equation in reduced form, because it is not of substantive interest in this study. The reduced-form specification of the attrition equation is identical to those used for the initial-conditions models, and is derived by substituting functions determining the endogenous regressors in the "structural" attrition model for those regressors. Table 4 provides employment distributions and transition rates from employment at W1 and W1ϩ1 by health status, health insurance coverage, EPRHI coverage, and age, all measured as of W1. The employment rate at W1 is 86.2% for men in good health and only 48.0% for men in bad health. This large difference illustrates the potential importance of allowing for the possibility that initial employment status is endogenous. Men in bad health who are employed at W1 exit the labor force at twice the rate of men in good health (12.8% versus 6.4%). The employment rate at W1 is highest among men with own-employer health insurance coverage (88.0%), private health insurance coverage (85.1%), and coverage from the spouse's employer (78.1%). Two-thirds of men with no health insurance and 64.9% of men with VA/CHAMPUS coverage are employed at W1. Men with EPRHI coverage at W1 are twelve percentage points less likely to be employed than men without such coverage (82.9% versus 94.9%), and conditional on being employed men with EPRHI are one-sixth more likely to exit employment by W1ϩ1 than are men without EPRHI (7.2% versus 6.1%). Interactions between health and EPRHI reveal that men in bad health exhibit large differences in employment at W1 by EPRHI coverage (81.8% versus 58.7%). Although those men in bad health without EPRHI 18 If we estimated models for initial health, health insurance, and EPRHI, and then separate models for health transitions, health insurance transitions, and EPRHI transitions, our logic suggests that the family background variables should be included in the initial-conditions models but not the transition models. However, to avoid an excessive number of parameters, we estimate a single model for health using the two observations provided by each individual, with the parameters restricted to be the same for both waves. Similar specifications are used for health insurance and EPRHI. Therefore, the family background variables enter all of these models. are more likely to be employed at W1, they are 16% more likely to exit employment by W1ϩ1 (11.3% versus 9.7%) than are those with EPRHI coverage. This could be due to men without EPRHI coverage experiencing a higher acceptance rate into the Social Security Disability Insurance program than men with EPRHI. However, among men in bad health who are still employed at W1ϩ1, the exit rate is 45% higher for men with EPRHI (15.4% versus 10.6%). Table 4 also illustrates the substantially lower employment rate among the older men in the sample and their higher labor force exit rate. Interacting age with EPRHI does not produce a consistent pattern in the employment transitions. The youngest men exit the labor force between W1 and W1ϩ1 at a higher rate when not covered, while the older men exit at a higher rate if covered. This could be due to differential availability of multiple sources of health insurance, such as private and spouse. The cross-tabulations do not account for this, but the econometric model does. Differences in the labor force exit rate between W1ϩ1 and W2 by EPRHI coverage are very small at the older ages. 19 The last two rows of the table show that employment transitions of the self-employed are less frequent than those of employees. In most of the analysis, we pool the selfemployed and employees, allowing intercept shifts, but we also estimated a specification that excluded the self-employed and found results that were very similar to those reported below.
V. Empirical Results
Table 5 displays selected coefficient estimates from a model without controls for endogeneity and from a model with controls for several sources of endogeneity. Both models use W1 regressors to explain transitions from W1 to W1ϩ1, and W2 regressors to explain transitions from W1ϩ1 to W2. We first discuss the results for the model with no endogeneity controls, because this specification is similar to those from previous papers.
A. Main Effects of Insurance
Own employer-provided health insurance is associated with a lower job-changing rate, but the estimate is not statistically significant. Spouse-employer-provided health insurance has a small and statistically insignificant impact on the job changing rate. Most previous studies have found that own-or spouse-employer health insurance has a negative effect on job switching (Monheit & Cooper, 1994; Gruber & Madrian, 1994; Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, & Rosen, 1996) . EPRHI is associated with a lower rate of job switching. This negative effect is smaller in absolute value for men in poor health and older men. None of the EPRHI variables have a statistically significant effect on job switching. There have not been any previous estimates of the effect of EPRHI on job switching in the literature.
EPRHI is associated with a lower labor force exit rate, but the estimate is not statistically significant. The EPRHI-age interaction is positive, so the negative effect of EPRHI on labor force exit diminishes with age and becomes positive by age 57. As indicated in the introduction, previous studies have found a positive effect of EPRHI on labor force exit for older workers (Karoly & Rogowski, 1994; Madrian, 1994) . It is interesting to note that the coefficient estimate on the variable indicating that the cost of EPRHI is paid entirely by the worker is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. As previously suggested, workers who report being covered by EPRHI and paying the entire premium may not be covered by EPRHI, but rather could be mistakenly reporting that they have EPRHI coverage when in fact they are eligible for continuation coverage under the CO-BRA mandate. 20 If this is the case, we would expect that EPRHI would not have a large positive effect on labor force 19 Previous studies have not examined how the effect of EPRHI varies with age. Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) do not find a consistent pattern of effects of COBRA coverage by age. 20 We thank Mike Hurd for pointing out this possibility to us. exit for such individuals, and the results are consistent with this. The negative main effect of EPRHI on labor force exit increases from Ϫ0.745 for workers who share the cost of EPRHI with the firm to Ϫ1.240 for workers who pay the full cost. Accounting for the age interaction, the effect of EPRHI for the latter group of workers does not turn positive until age 61. The coefficient estimate on the variable indicating that the firm pays the entire EPRHI premium is 0.473. For this group of workers, the EPRHI effect on labor force exit becomes positive by age 53.
The main effect of EPRHI on the labor force entry rate is positive, but the coefficient estimate has a large standard error, and the health and age interactions are both small and statistically insignificant. Previous studies have not estimated the effect of EPRHI on labor force entry.
B. Robustness of Estimates
How robust are these estimates to controls for the endogeneity of attrition, initial conditions, and health insurance? The second column of table 5 presents estimates from a model that jointly estimates equations for initial employment status, attrition, health status, own-and spouse-employer health insurance, and EPRHI along with the employment transition models. 21 There are some notable differences in the estimated effects of EPRHI with controls for endogeneity. The negative main effect of EPRHI on job switching more than doubles in absolute value and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative main effect of EPRHI on labor force exit becomes smaller, while the age interaction is unchanged. The EPRHI effect on labor force exit turns positive by age 54 in these estimates. The positive main effect of EPRHI on labor force entry becomes larger and statistically significant at 10%, and the negative interaction with age indicates that the effect of EPRHI on labor force entry becomes negative by age 61.
We estimated models that included various subsets of the equations for attrition, initial employment, health, health insurance, and EPRHI. Adding the equation for EPRHI produced substantial changes in the estimated effects of EPRHI on employment transitions, as one might expect, but so also did adding equations for attrition and initial employment status. We also estimated a model that added equations for the wage rate, job tenure, and duration of the current non-employment spell if not employed. The estimated EPRHI effects in this specification were very similar to those reported in the second column of table 5.
We reestimated the models reported in the second column of Although a number of the EPRHI parameter estimates are statistically insignificant, EPRHI is a very significant variable in the model as a whole: a likelihood-ratio test strongly rejects excluding all EPRHI variables from the model. The estimated EPRHI effect on labor force exit is in the direction predicted by theory by age 57 at the latest, and in some specifications by age 53. At younger ages, the EPRHI effects on labor force exit and entry are the opposite of the effects predicted by the theory, which may indicate that jobs offering EPRHI have unobserved desirable features that make them more attractive than jobs without EPRHI. We control for the wage rate and pension plan characteristics, but there may be other important job characteristics that we do not observe. As workers age and the attractiveness of non-employment increases, the EPRHI effects predicted by the theory become apparent in the results. We reestimated the model omitting job characteristics other than health insurance and EPRHI to determine whether the EPRHI effects were sensitive to controls for the job characteristics that we do observe. (The wage, pension availability and characteristics, job tenure, union coverage, and self-employment status are dropped.) Although this had very little impact on the estimated EPRHI effect on exit from employment, it did result in a substantially smaller negative impact of EPRHI on job switching.
We argued that if poor health in the present is a good predictor of future poor health, then the EPRHI effects would be stronger for men in poor health. The results, however, do not support this prediction: most of the health-EPRHI interaction coefficients are of the wrong sign with or without controls for the endogeneity of health, and all are statistically insignificant. This indicates that EPRHI is equally valuable to men in good and poor health, or that our measure of health is too crude to capture the demand for health insurance. We reestimated the model with a number of alternative health measures to determine whether the results are sensitive to the particular health measure that we chose. No statistically significant interactions were noted between any of the health measures and EPRHI. The fact that the absence of EPRHI-health interactions is generally robust across alternative health measures suggests that EPRHI is valuable to men in good as well as poor health. Many older men in good health may perceive a substantial risk of the onset of bad health as they age, so our presumption that current health is a good predictor of future health may be incorrect. Alternatively, EPRHI may be picking up the effects of omitted job or individual characteristics, despite the 21 All of these equations are binary logits. The results are from a model with four points of support in the heterogeneity distribution. This provided a significant improvement in the fit over three points of support, while five points of support provided little further improvement. The model is identified without exclusion restrictions because of the nonlinearity of the discrete-factor specification, but, as indicated, we have imposed some exclusion restrictions to provide additional identification. A test for overidentification indicated that the hypothesis that the overidentifying variables can be excluded from the employment transition models could not be rejected at the 5% level. We tested whether the identifying variables could be excluded from the auxiliary equations and rejected this hypothesis at the 5% level. The other parameter estimates from the specification in column 2 are given in appendix A.
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many covariates included and the controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Privately purchased health insurance and health insurance from the spouse's employer could be substitutes for EPRHI in reducing the risk of exposure to catastrophic medical expenses when not employed. This suggests that men with such forms of health insurance coverage may behave similarly to men with EPRHI. The empirical results do not provide any strong evidence of this. Private health insurance has effects on labor force exit and entry of the "wrong" sign (see table A1), and the effects of spouse health insurance are also quite different from those of EPRHI (table 5) . This difference between the effects of EPRHI and other sources of health insurance that are independent of employment status suggests that risk reduction may not be the driving factor behind the EPRHI effects. As noted, we have attempted to rule out other explanations for the EPRHI effects, but we may not have succeeded.
C. Simulations
To evaluate the quantitative implications of the parameter estimates, we present simulations in table 6 and figure 1 based on the results from the second column of table 5. 22 The first two rows of table 6 show that the model provides a reasonably close fit to the sample transition proportions. On average, EPRHI with cost sharing increases the annual rate of labor force exit from 0.066 to 0.084, reduces the job-switching rate from 0.069 to 0.033, and increases the entry rate from 0.115 to 0.146. The effect of EPRHI on labor force exit is stronger if the firm pays the entire cost of EPRHI: the labor force exit rate rises from 0.066 to 0.112. The effect of EPRHI on the rate of labor force exit if the individual pays the entire cost is zero. The lower panel of table 6 shows simulation results for the model based on all W1 regressors. The effect of EPRHI on labor force exit is very similar. 22 The simulations are computed for each individual in the sample, integrating over the estimated heterogeneity distribution and averaged over the sample. To generate standard errors for the simulations, we drew a vector of random normal variates with mean equal to the parameter point estimates and variance-covariance matrix given by the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. We computed simulations using these random draws, and repeated the process 1,000 times to generate a distribution of simulations. The figures reported in the table are the mean and standard deviation of the simulations over the 1,000 replications. Figure 1 illustrates how labor force exit and entry vary with age and EPRHI, respectively, based on the model shown in column 2 of table 5. The age gradient of the exit rate for men with health insurance from their own employer but no EPRHI is small: 0.064 to 0.070 from ages 51 to 61. The age gradient is much larger for men with EPRHI: 0.050 to 0.148. The age gradient for labor force entry is also strongly affected by EPRHI: 0.189 to 0.084 for men without EPRHI versus 0.360 to 0.077 for men with EPRHI. These large differences indicate a major role of EPRHI as men age that is not due to unobserved heterogeneity associated with attrition, health insurance and EPRHI coverage, or initial employment and health status. The effect of EPRHI on the age gradient of the labor force exit rate is even larger in the model that uses all W1 regressors (not shown).
To determine whether the linear specification of the age-EPRHI effects is unduly restrictive, we reestimated the employment transition models with four age dummies, including both as main effects and interacted with EPRHI. The results confirm that the positive EPRHI effect on labor force exit increases with age and that the negative effect of EPRHI on entry also increases with age. However, most of the age-EPRHI interactions were not estimated precisely enough to draw any firm conclusions about the adequacy of the linear specification.
D. Comparisons to Literature
How do the estimated effects of EPRHI on employment transitions of older men presented here compare to previous estimates from other sources? Karoly and Rogowski (1994) did not have data on EPRHI in their SIPP sample of men aged 55-62 and were forced to impute it on the basis of firm size, industry, and region. Their estimates indicate that EPRHI increases the probability of retiring within a 2.5-year period by eight percentage points from a base of 17%. As Madrian (1994) notes, this is likely to be an overestimate, because other factors associated with firm size and industry that are unmeasured by Karoly and Rogowski (such as pensions and working conditions) are likely to have a positive impact on retirement as well. Nevertheless, this estimate is smaller than ours: at age 58, which is the average age in the sample used by Karoly and Rogowski, we find a 4.2 percentage point effect on exit from employment during a one-year period with cost sharing, and a 7.1 percentage point effect if the firm pays the entire cost. Madrian (1994) uses samples of men aged 55-84 who had already retired as of the survey date in two SIPP samples and in the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) to estimate the effect of EPRHI on the age at retirement. Her results show that EPRHI reduces the age at retirement by 1.2 years in the NMES data and by 0.4 to 0.7 years in the SIPP data. She notes the obvious potential for biases due to sample truncation on being retired and alive at the survey date, and suggests that these biases are likely to be toward zero. Similarly ignoring the risk of labor market reentry and extrapolating the linear age effects beyond age 62, our estimates imply that an average man who was employed at age 51 with employer-health insurance would retire 3.3 years earlier with EPRHI than without it. When we account for labor force reentry, this figure increases to 6.1 years. However, these calculations ignore the fact that Medicare becomes available at 65. If we assume that the EPRHI/no-EPRHI transition rate differences become zero at age 65, reflecting the availability of EPRHI-like coverage from Medicare, then the simulations indicate that EPRHI reduces the expected age of exit from the labor force by 1.8 years ignoring reentry, and by 1.5 years accounting for reentry. 23 Gruber and Madrian (1995) estimated that the annual hazard rate for retirement of men aged 55-64 was 1.7 percentage points higher as a result of the availability of COBRA continuation coverage mandates. Measured in terms of the months of continuation coverage provided, their estimates imply that a year of continuation coverage raises the retirement hazard rate by 2.2 percentage points. Gruber and Madrian (1996) estimate that one year of continuation coverage availability increases the stock of retirees among men aged 55-64 by 1.1 percentage points on average, which represents a 5.4% increase in the probability of being retired. Continuation coverage mandates provide a maximum of eighteen months of coverage after leaving an employer, so it is not clear whether their estimates can be meaningfully compared to ours. Our estimates of the effect of EPRHI on labor force exit are larger than Gruber and Madrian's (1995) estimates of the effect of continuation coverage when evaluated at the average age in their sample. Furthermore, our estimates imply that, in a sample of men who are all employed at age 51, those who have EPRHI will have a non-employment rate of 0.65 by age 62, while those who do not have EPRHI will have a non-employment rate of 0.53 by age 62. This is a substantially larger difference than the average effect reported by Gruber and Madrian (1996) . Finally, Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate that men with health insurance that is not tied to employment have a two-year labor force exit rate that is nine percentage points higher at ages 60-61 than the rate for men with employer health insurance in their RHS sample. This does not correspond precisely to the EPRHI/non-EPRHI distinction, but it is a reasonable approximation given the available data in the RHS. Our estimates imply an effect of EPRHI on the one-year labor force exit rate of eight percentage points at age 61. (See figure 1.) What accounts for the larger effects of EPRHI on the labor force exit rate of men that we find compared to those found in earlier studies? Three possible explanations are that our data measure EPRHI more accurately, that we control for the possible endogeneity of EPRHI and other key variables, and that we use data from the 1990s rather than from earlier periods. We cannot determine the importance of the last factor, but we can shed some light on the possible role of measurement and endogeneity. Most of the earlier studies did not have access to accurate data on EPRHI coverage. Karoly and Rogowski (1994) used an employer survey to estimate an equation to explain EPRHI as a function of industry, firm size, and region, and then used the coefficient estimates to impute EPRHI to the workers in their SIPP sample. We replicated their approach by estimating an equation with a specification identical to theirs using the HRS data. We reestimated our model of employment transitions using an imputed measure of EPRHI constructed from the estimated EPRHI equation (setting EPRHI to zero if the individual did not have employer-provided health insurance, and omitting the auxiliary EPRHI equation from the model). Using the imputed measure of EPRHI reduces the magnitude of most of the estimated EPRHI effects compared to using a reported measure of EPRHI. The effect of EPRHI on labor force exit is 0.009 versus 0.021 in table 6, the estimated effect of EPRHI on job switching is 0.016 versus 0.041, and the estimated effect of EPRHI on labor force entry is 0.084 versus 0.115. These findings suggest that the relatively accurate measure of EPRHI coverage available in the HRS may help account for the larger effects that we find.
The coefficient estimates in table 5 indicate that controlling for the endogeneity of EPRHI and other variables causes a large increase in the negative effect of EPRHI on job switching and a reduction of three years in the age by which the EPRHI effect on labor force exit becomes positive, but an increase of approximately seven years in the age at which the effect of EPRHI on labor force entry becomes negative. Our results suggest that treating EPRHI as exogenous may have led previous studies to underestimate the impact of EPRHI on labor force exit.
V. Conclusion
Retiree health insurance is an important factor in the employment transition decisions of older men. Differences in the employment exit rate by EPRHI average approximately 0.02 per year and are as high as 0.08 per year at age 61. The EPRHI effects are larger still if the firm pays the entire cost. These effects are larger than those found in previous studies, which is likely due in part to better data that provide both more-accurate EPRHI measures and a longitudinal design. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has a substantial impact on the estimates. Previous studies have not accounted for unobserved heterogeneity, and this may help explain why our estimate of the effect of EPRHI on labor force exit is larger than it had been in past studies. It is also possible that the impact of EPRHI has increased in the 1990s compared to the 1970s and 1980s when the data used in previous studies were collected. The fact that we are able to control for many other job characteristics that could be correlated with EPRHI coverage makes it unlikely that the estimated effects of the EPRHI variables are seriously biased as a result of omitted job characteristics.
As indicated in the introduction, there are no reliable time-series data on EPRHI availability, so it is not possible to determine with any confidence how much of the decline in employment of older men in the United States can be attributed to changes in the availability of EPRHI. However, some illustrative calculations of the possible order of magnitude of the effect can be made. Madrian (1994) reports that 50% of retirees in the 1984 panel of the SIPP who retired between 1980 and 1987 were covered by EPRHI, while 24% of those who retired between 1960 and 1964 (and were still alive in 1984) had EPRHI coverage. If mortality is not selective with respect to EPRHI coverage, then these figures suggest that EPRHI coverage increased by 26 percentage points during this period. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) fell from 91% to 80% from 1964 to 1984 for men aged 55-59, and from 79% to 56% for men aged 60-64 (Burkhauser & Quinn, 1994) . Simulations based on our estimates indicate that men who are employed at age 51 on a job with health insurance coverage and who experience the age-specific exit and entry hazards implied by our estimates will have a LFPR at ages 55-59 of 0.745 on average without EPRHI and 0.658 with EPRHI. When multiplied by the change in EPRHI coverage of 0.26 implied by Madrian's figures, our estimates imply that changes in EPRHI coverage can explain 0.023 of the 0.11 change in male LFPR at ages 55-59, or 21% of the change. Our model predicts an average LFPR at ages 60-64 of 0.471 without EPRHI and 0.352 with EPRHI. This is a difference of 0.12, which, when multiplied by 0.26, yields a change of 0.031 in the LFPR that could be "accounted for" by the change in EPRHI availability. This amounts to 13% of the observed decline of 0.23 in the male LFPR at these ages. These figures should be considered no more than illustrative at best for many obvious reasons; taken at face value, they suggest that EPRHI contributed to declining male employment since the 1960s, but was not the dominant factor.
Our results suggest that estimating the structural parameters of a model of employment and medical care decisions could be an important and useful next step in understanding the role of health insurance in retirement decisions. EPRHI effects are clearly important, and health insurance reform could therefore have a major impact on the labor force behavior of older individuals. This impact cannot be quantified without estimates of structural parameters.
APPENDIX A
Recall from section II's equation (6) that the probability of making a transition from employment state k to j is given by
where J k indicates the number of employment alternatives that are available to an individual who chose employment state k in the previous period. Let ⌰ denote the vector of parameters in the model, including the points of support of the distribution of and the factor loadings. The probability of health insurance coverage through one's employer or spouse's employer, EPRHI, and health status at t is denoted by I h (Z, h , 2h ), where h indicates the particular health or health insurance equation and there are H such equations, Z is a vector of explanatory variables, h is a parameter vector, and 2h is a factor loading. Let p(A ϭ 1 | Z, A , A ) represent the probability of attrition from the sample, where A ϭ 1 denotes attrition, A ϭ 0 denotes non-attrition, A is a parameter vector, and A is a factor loading. Let I c (Z, c , 3c ) represent the probability of observing a given value of the cth initial condition as of the initial survey (employment status and so on), and there are C such equations, where c is a parameter vector, and 3c is a factor loading. The contribution to the likelihood function of individual n who does not attrit, conditional on , is Unconditional on the permanent error component , the likelihood contribution of individual n is
where is the vector of probabilities of the M points of support of the heterogeneity distribution, and a is the observed attrition outcome. The likelihood function for a sample of size N is 
